Recently, there was a new authentication and key distribution protocol presented in [EHA98] . In this paper we show that certain claims on its properties are not valid. We also suggest some modifications to strengthen this protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Authentication and key distribution protocols are the basis of security in many distributed systems. Kerberos [KNT94] , authenticated Diffie-Hellman [Fo94] , SPX [TA91] and others belong to the well-known authentication and/or key distribution protocols. Various additional requirements, such as performance, encryption systems used, security goals, lead to the design of new cryptographic protocols. Every (new) protocol has to be analysed carefully in great detail to avoid bugs, security weaknesses and redundancy -see e.g. [BAN90, Me92] . A good survey of formal methods for the analysis of authentication protocols is [RH93] .
Recently, a new protocol for authentication and key distribution has been presented ( [EHA98] ). In this paper it will be referred to as EHA. In order to prove that the proposed protocol satisfies stated goals, the authors used the BAN logic, see e.g. [BAN90] . However, despite this formal analysis of the EHA, this protocol still contains several weaknesses which do not stem from the BAN logic itself but rather from the context in which the logic was used. It is worth to mention that the BAN logic does not provide "proof" of security, it just increases confidence in protocols. Recently, more useful complexity-theoretic approaches have emerged, see e.g. [BR95] .
First, we describe the protocol. Then, we show its weaknesses and propose some modifications of the EHA protocol to strengthen (and fix) it.
DESCRIPTION OF EHA PROTOCOL
The EHA protocol consists of three modules: the setup module, the login module and the authentication/key distribution module. It uses both symmetric encryption and public key encryption/key distribution algorithms. The protocol requires trusted third party, so called Security Management Facility (SM F ).
SETUP MODULE
The setup module is executed once, when a new station (participant) has joined the network. Let us suppose a principal C wants to join the network. His communication with the SM F consists of three steps.
Setup module:
K X denotes the public key of a principal X (C or SM F ). Message m encrypted with key K will be denoted by {m} K . The protocol assumes that the participants know the public key of the SM F . First, C sends his identity and public key. The SM F generates a symmetric key K SM F,C (this key is supposed for use in subsequent modules for trusted communication between the SM F and C). It answers with its identity, generator a and modulus p in the Diffie-Hellman system, and nonce N SM F . The SM F sends the signature of these parameters generated with the help of its private key K −1 SM F . It also sends key K SM F,C and its signature, both encrypted with the public key of C -K C . Principal C verifies the signature, decrypts key K SM F,C and checks its signature. C chooses his key z in Diffie-Hellman and replies with his public key (a z mod p) and nonce both encrypted with K SM F,C . The SM F decrypts the received message and checks the correctness of nonce. Having successfully finished the module, the SM F stores public key (a z mod p) and communication key
LOGIN MODULE
This module is executed during login to the system (network). The aim of this module is to change symmetric keys between the SM F and principals, and public keys of principals in Diffie-Hellman to decrease the risk of their exposure. After executing the login module, both C and the SM F share new symmetric key K SM F,C (generated by SM F ) and C has a new public key a z mod p (generated by C) which is stored in the SM F .
Login module:
N SM F denotes (again) nonce generated by the SM F . Principal C checks the freshness of the received message in step 2 by comparing a z mod p with the one already sent. The SM F ensures that message in step 3 is fresh using the nonce N SM F .
AUTHENTICATION AND KEY DISTRIBUTION MODULE
This module is executed when two principals A and B want to communicate securely. The symmetric key K is computed as a xy mod p. The goals of the module are (as stated in [EHA98] ):
"As a result of execution of the authentication and key distribution module both A and B authenticate each other and establish the symmetric key a xy mod p."
Symmetric key K is computed as a xy mod p, just like in the DiffieHellman key exchange protocol, where a x mod p is the public key of A and a y mod p is the public key of B.
Authentication and Key Distribution module:
Description of symbols used in the module:
N A -nonce generated by A; N B -nonce generated by B; x -private key of A for Diffie-Hellman; a x mod p -public key of A in Diffie-Hellman; y -private key of B for Diffie-Hellman; a y mod p -public key of B in Diffie-Hellman.
Upon receiving a reply from the SF M in step 4 A decrypts the first part of the message and checks nonce N A to ensure the freshness of the message. Then A computes symmetric key K = (a y mod p) x mod p. Analogously, principal B decrypts the first part of message in step 5 and checks nonce N B . B computes key K = (a x mod p) y mod p and verifies the second part of the received message. A performs an additional check (using nonce N A ) after step 5 of this module.
The BAN logic analysis performed in [EHA98] yielded the following results (described in the BAN logic syntax):
So, principal A believes that K is a good key for communication with B and B believes that K is a good key for communication with A. Moreover, A believes that B believes in "goodness" of K and vice-versa.
WEAKNESSES
In this section we present weaknesses in the EHA protocol. First notice the lack of "authenticity checks" in the setup module. The SM F doesn't authenticate principal C, and hence the SM F has no guarantee whatsoever about who it is that knows the shared secret key K SM F,C , and whose public key K C is.
FAKE AUTHENTICITY
The BAN logic analysis performed in [EHA98] deals only with the authentication and key distribution module. Therefore, initial assumptions in the analysis are based on the correctness and security of the setup and the login modules. Our attack is based on the observation that the SM F doesn't check in the login module whether the principal actually knows the private key corresponding to the submitted public key.
Let us denote an attacker by E. He wants to convince principal B that his identity is A. E waits until A initializes communication with him, i.e. starts the authentication and key distribution module. We denote the steps in this instance of module with prefix "AE":
AE1. A → E: A, N A
Immediately, E finds out B's current public key. He obtains this key from the SM F through sending the message:
where N E and N B are nonces generated by E himself. The SM F assumes that step 3 in the authentication and key distribution module was performed. Thus, the SM F answers with the message containing B's current public key. Nobody is affected by this "investigation". The attacker can begin his session with B (steps in this instance of the module will be denoted with prefix "EB").
E changes his public key to a y mod p (the B's public key) in the login module. He is able to do this, because the SM F does not verify the knowledge of a private key corresponding to the submitted public key. Then, he proceeds in communication with A (notice, N B is the same nonce as principal B chose and announced in EB2):
where K = a xy mod p. Now, the attacker can use message {N B } K to proceed with the step 5 in "EB" protocol:
The authentication and key distribution module was finished successfully. Principal B believes that E is A and K is the good key for communication with A. In fact E doesn't know the value of K, but it convinced B of his fake identity. However, since the authenticity is often the only check performed in various situations, there is a serious risk in using this protocol in such contexts.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that E can continue to communicate with B for a while. Principal A will probably try to reestablish communication with E. This enables E to use key K to encrypt an arbitrary plaintext (as it did with N B ) in this execution of the authentication and key distribution module.
The simplest method to avoid this threat is to enforce checking that the public key submitted to the SM F in the setup and login modules is unique. This solution is purely implementational and requires further specification as to deal with conflicts in the protocol. Moreover, it doesn't ensure that the principal knows the private key corresponding to the sent public key. So, he can send a key which is, actually, different but related to the public key of some principal (such as its square etc.) and, therefore, also constructed session keys are related.
Another method to avoid this threat could be based on the usage of key K for authentication. That is, the last steps in the authentication and key distribution module should be modified to perform mutual authentication of A and B. On the other hand, one has to keep in mind the attacker's ability to encrypt chosen text when A tries to reestablish the session.
A very robust way to ensure the possession of the private key corresponding to the submitted public key is the zero-knowledge proof for discrete logarithm, see [CEGP88] . On the other hand, such solution substantially increases the communication overhead.
Another solution can be based on challenge-response schemes where the SM F challenges the principal to encrypt something (generated by the SM F itself) with his private key. Further check (decryption) ensures the possession of the private key by the principal.
COMPROMISING SMF
the symmetric keys and compromise of the SM F 's private key. In both situations, as expected, the attacker can mount various attacks. The compromise of the SM F 's private key affects the security of the setup modul. In the case of the compromised symmetric keys is the "man in the middle" attack the most efficient one. Let us assume the authentication and key distribution module and denote the attacker as E. First and second steps of the module are executed as described. E intercepts the third message and send to A in step 4 message:
where w is E's own private key (possibly generated only for this session). The principal A computes key K 1 = a xw mod p and uses it for constructing the second part of the message in step 5. E intercepts (again) this message and sends to B the following:
